

***United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit***



**PETITION FOR
REHEARING
EN BANC**

75-1153

United States Court of Appeals

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Docket No. 75-1153

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellee,

—v.—

JACKSON D. LEONARD,

Defendant-Appellant.

ON APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

ANSWER FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO
POINT III OF THE PETITION FOR REHEARING WITH
SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING EN BANC

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


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**ANSWER FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA TO
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Preliminary Statement

Judgment of conviction was entered as to Jackson D. Leonard on March 7, 1975, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York after a seven day trial before the Honorable Richard Owen, United States District Judge, and a jury.*

On August 28, 1975, this Court (Moore, Friendly and Van Graafeiland, *C.JJ.*) rendered its decision affirming the judgment of conviction.

* For a complete statement as to the charges in the indictment, the jury's verdict and the sentence imposed by Judge Owen, see the Preliminary Statement of the government's brief on appeal.

On September 11, 1975 Jackson D. Leonard filed a petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc. On September 22, 1975, this Court ordered the government to file an answer to Point III of defendant Leonard's petition.

ARGUMENT

POINT III

Neither the books of account nor the signed tax return prove that Leonard's Subchapter S corporation suffered a loss during calendar year 1968. Leonard's proof and his request to charge failed to take this into account.

Leonard claims that three exhibits established that his Subchapter S corporation, Leonard Process Co., Inc. (hereafter Leonard, Inc.) had no earnings and profits in its 1968 fiscal year from which taxable dividends could have been paid and, accordingly, it was error for the District Court to have refused to enter a judgment of acquittal on Count Two. The argument remains incorrect.

As a factual matter, Leonard must, of necessity, ignore the variance between the Leonard, Inc. tax year originally elected—calendar 1968—and that appearing in the corporate returns for the twelve months ending January 31, 1969, despite the absolute prohibition forbidding such unilateral changes. Whether the profitability of Leonard, Inc. for calendar 1968 would have been the same or by some amount different from that for the period ending January 31, 1969 is a subject which Leonard chose not to pursue by calling an appropriate witness. Undoubtedly, the Leonard, Inc. books could have been closed as of December 31, 1968, and upon the inclusion of his January 1968 proprietorship results, a

recomputation of profitability for calendar 1968 could have been undertaken. Leonard elected, however, not to prove such results. Instead, he rested his defense on his claim that his accountant, Leskiewicz, was not authorized to sign Leonard's 1968 individual return. That return, of course, failed to report any income or loss by Leonard, Inc., or Leonard's receipt of any nontaxable distributions from it (see other Subchapter S corporate results reported by Leonard in Schedule B, Part III of GX 2 at E. 41; see also Part II, 1d for "Nontaxable distributions" of GX 2 at E. 40).^{*} Accordingly, neither Judge

^{*} Leonard's decision to refrain from calling the preparer of Leonard, Inc.'s tax returns—who could have authenticated them—was clearly not mere happenstance. That individual, if called, would have been required to explain who reduced Leonard, Inc.'s stated income for the pertinent period by \$40,000 by switching \$40,000 from the "Fees" column to a "Misc." receipt labeled "loan" (compare GX 87A at E. 391 with Bardes' original draft which immediately follows it in GX 87 (attached hereto as Addendum "A") and with the corresponding checkbook stub GX 88A in GX 88 (attached hereto as Addendum "B")), thereby raising the originally calculated corporate loss from \$29,017.77 (GX 94 at E. 465) to \$73,742.33 (DX X at E. 559) for even the year ending January 31, 1969. Leonard's declination to call the authenticating preparer cannot be undone simply because his own signature appears on the original of that latter return (DX Y at E. 564). Without the authenticating preparer, the returns remained inadmissible. See *Standard Oil Co. of California v. Moore*, 251 F.2d 188, 222-223 (9th Cir. 1957), *cert. denied*, 356 U.S. 975 (1958). Apparently Leonard's counsel recognized this since at the time of the offer, he said that he did not "necessarily offer the first" (A. 977) page bearing Leonard's signature.

Of course, if Leonard, Inc. had suffered a loss of \$29,017.77 rather than \$73,742.33, the distribution of \$52,455.22 to Leonard during the months of 1968, save for January, would have resulted in taxable income to Leonard of more than \$23,000—hardly immaterial. The amount of the taxable distribution might even be greater if the profitability of Leonard, Inc. for January 1968 is also considered—given, among other things, the receipt by Leonard, Inc. that month of \$6,229.20 in override payments.

Owen nor the jury had sufficient information from which to make any findings "as a matter of law" as to whether the character of the funds received was: (i) a "distribution which is a dividend" (IRC §§ 301(c)(1), 316); (ii) a "distribution which is not a dividend" (IRC § 301(c)(2)) but which, to the extent that it exceeded Leonard's adjusted basis, still qualified "as a gain from the sale or exchange of property" (IRC §§ 301(c)(3)(A), 1016(a)(3)); or (iii) a distribution constituting a return of capital during calendar 1968 and therefore non-taxable.* In short, none of the three exhibits said to have been overlooked, proves anything like the claim of a loss which converts the diverted funds into a tax free return of capital.

We respectfully suggest that in the context of a criminal proceeding, *Davis v. United States*, 226 F.2d 331 (6th Cir. 1955), is the leading case on this issue. It rejects any supposed burden on the part of the government to prove the profitability of a corporation from which a defendant shareholder embezzles funds. That decision flatly held that the government need not prove corporate profitability and retained earnings in order to

* Of course, Leonard could have selected a less thinly capitalized corporate structure than either of those shown on the returns (\$100 capital and \$94,900 in loans from shareholders (DX X at E. 562 and DX Y at E. 567), or \$100 capital and \$54,900 in loans from shareholders (GX 44 at E. 469))—in which case his return of capital argument would be unavailing to the extent distributions to him were in excess of his adjusted basis. Moreover, had Leonard, Inc.'s books been closed on December 31, 1968, rather than January 31, 1969, the loans then payable (see GX 87 account 204) would have been either \$20,000 or \$60,000 (depending, of course, upon the treatment of the \$40,000 receipt of Oct. 22, 1968). Accordingly, assuming the same \$100 adjusting debit to capital and \$20,000 in loans repayable (GX 87—Journal, p. "J-1"), approximately \$38,000 of the override payments could not properly be said to have been loan repayments.

charge a defendant stockholder with failing to report those of his diversions which he treated as his own. Our research discloses that it has been approved by the only other circuit court squarely to consider the issue in the criminal context. See *Hartman v. United States* 245 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1957). It should not be now rejected—particularly in light of the peculiar circumstances of this case.

DiZenzo v. C.I.R., 348 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1965), is not authority for Leonard's argument that he was entitled to have his Request To Charge E read to the jury. Leonard's requested charge switched the burden of proof to the government without even the slightest suggestion in *DiZenzo* that such might be appropriate in criminal cases. Additionally, in *DiZenzo* the corporation's returns had been filed for all of the disputed years. Here, in contrast, the financial position of Leonard, Inc. has never been disclosed or declared in any fashion—neither in the corporate minutes (DX AJ) nor in the required report of distributions "from sources other than earned surplus" (N.Y. Bus. Corp. Law § 510(c)). Here, even more so than in *Holland v. United States*, 348 U.S. 121 (1954), the government simply does not bear the endless burden of proving every conceivably relevant negative depending upon the course of the trial. If and when a Subchapter S taxpayer embezzles funds from a small business corporation properly identified in his individual tax return as having a loss or gain to be passed through to him under IRC § 1374(a), and fails also to report his receipt of such diversions, a closer case may be presented for requiring the government to go forward. In any event, Leonard's request was far too broad under any approach.

CONCLUSION

The petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

PAUL J. CURRAN,
*United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York,
Attorney for the United States
of America.*

W. CULLEN MACDONALD,
JOHN C. SABETTA,
*Assistant United States Attorneys,
Of Counsel.*

ADDENDA

			Deposits	Fees	Int Paid	Misc.	
	1968						
1	1	6	Union Carbide	37000000	37000000		1
2	2	13	"	37000000	37000000		2
3	3	21	"	37000000	37000000		3
4	4		Reimbursement	24926		24926	4
5	5	15	Union Carbide	37000000	37000000		5
6	6	18	"	37000000	37000000		6
7	7	26	Lipart + Overman	50927		50927	7
8	8		Williams	16700		16700	8
9	9	2	Chimique	99875	99875		9
10	10	21	Union Carbide	37000000	37000000		10
11	11	9	Chimique Chimrock	1227131	1227131		11
12	12	6	Power Gas	15000000	15000000		12
13	13	21	"	15000000	15000000		13
14	14	19	StnC refund	4900		4900	14
15	15	20	Power Gas	15000000	15000000		15
16	16	22	Williams	30000	30000		16
17	17		R.C. Lipart	50400	50400		17
18	18		Williams	4000000	4000000		18
19	19	25	Williams	1100	1100		19
20	20	31	R. Deard	21065	21065		20
21	21	26	J.D. Leonard	22288	22288		21
22	22	17	Williams	22288	22288		22
23	23		1968				23
24	24	2	By La. State	230874		230874	24
25	25		J.D. Leonard	1000000		1000000	25
26	26	17	R. Deard	19615	9615	10000	26
27	27	27	J.D. Leonard	2500000		2500000	27
28	28		Chimrock Chem.	162254	162254		28
29	29	28	Treadwell - Overcharge	472456	472456		29
30	30			38634611	38634611		30

ADDENDUM "A"

Bardes' original draft of Cash
Received by Leonard, Inc.
(GX 87)

2a

*[For the Convenience of Court and Counsel this
Addendum is printed on the opposite page]*

3a

DATE DEPOSITS

10/22 68

BALANCE FORWARDED	14,060	07
	40,000	-
	50,060	07
		104
	50,059	97
+	1,000	00
	51,059	97

(see up to ch. 475)

from JDL

USA 33a-475
(ED. 4-23-71)

GOVERNMENT

EXHIBIT
U. S. DIST. COURT
S. D. OF N. Y.

88A

Di

FBI-2 2-73-100-8753

TOTAL DEPOSITS

TOTAL CHECKS DRAWN

BAL. CARRIED FORWARD

51,059 97

1,025 53

50,034 44

No. 524

10/22 1968

St. Charles Garage

Parking - ~~XXXX~~

65-7

No. 525

10/22 1968

LTJ World Communications

Cables

91 85

No. 526

10/23 1968

Internal memo due

Ad. quarterly report

no later date

Up to Sept 1968

565 68

FIRST NATIONAL CITY BANK

10 25 53

ADDENDUM "B"

Checkbook Stub
(GX 88A)

AFFIDAVIT OF MAILING


STATE OF NEW YORK)
) ss.:
COUNTY OF NEW YORK)

JOHN C. SABETTA, being duly sworn, deposes and says that he is employed in the office of the United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.

That on the 9th day of October, 1975
he served 2 copies of the within brief by placing the same
in a properly postpaid franked envelope addressed:


James Schreiber, Esq.
Walter, Conston, Schurtman & Gumpel, P. C.
330 Madison Avenue
New York, New York 10017

And deponent further says that he sealed the said envelope and placed the same in the mail drop for mailing at the United States Courthouse, Foley Square, Borough of Manhattan, City of New York.



Sworn to before me this

9th day of October, 1975



JEANETTE ANN GRAYEB
Notary Public, State of New York
No. 24-1541575
Qualified in Kings County
Commission Expires March 30, 1977

